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Forthcoming in Nations and Nationalism 
 
Jewish Conditions, Theories of Nationalism: Cartographical Notes 
 
Liliana Riga (Edinburgh) and John A. Hall (McGill) 
 
 European thinkers with Jewish backgrounds, whether ascribed, embraced or 
denied, experienced nationalism in the most visceral ways imaginable. Their reactions and 
theorizations to this new political form in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were varied and complex, and of enormous interest for nationalist studies. This essay 
seeks to open a research agenda: though a good deal can be said thanks to specialized 
studies on which we draw, we make no claim that a complete account is offered. These are 
cartographical notes, mapping some but not all of the territory involved. 
 
We begin by describing the complexity of conditions and dilemmas facing thinkers 
with Jewish backgrounds across Europe, taking as our point of departure the observation 
that these thinkers created much of the grammar that we use when thinking about 
nationalism. The discussion is then organized around four broad theoretical frames, with 
the choices made and the theoretical routes that resulted analyzed in the core of the paper, 
characteristically with reference to particular theorists. A measure of fuzziness will be 
present. All the routes described characterize nationalism but only a few thinkers within 
them created fully-fledged social scientific theories of nations and nationalism. Jean-Paul 
Sartre insisted that Flaubert was a bourgeois writer, but added that not every bourgeois 
was a Flaubert. In that vein we can say that whilst most Jewish thinkers experienced 
nationalism not all of them theorized it. The conclusion offers some reflections on the 
differential quality of the more fully developed social scientific theories of this protean 
force. 
 
Two prefatory comments are needed, to note the scope of the essay and to avoid 
misunderstanding. The first is obvious. Thinkers of the period discussed who did not have 
Jewish backgrounds also contributed to our understanding of nationalism, as Ernest 
Gellner made clear when privileging the insights of Malinowski above those of 
Wittgenstein (Gellner 1998). Hence the claim being made is about disproportion rather 
than exclusivity. Still the analysis will later allow for a general speculation as to the social 
worlds or moments that encouraged thought about nationalism. The second consideration 
is complex, and more important. There has been something of a revolution in the study of 
nationalism—following from subtle changes in social theory. Concepts used in daily life 
may mislead scientific analysis. Nationalism is a category of practice as well as a category 
of analysis (Brubaker 2004). This has pointed all of us towards understanding 
nationalism—at least on occasion—as a homogenizing practice of elites, trying to 
discipline varied peoples so as force them into a single mold. The analytic point can apply 
all the more to the category of ‘Jew’, most certainly given its use by anti-Semites. Is it 
right, to put the matter pointedly, to consider someone Jewish who is secular, wholly 
bereft of cultural loyalty to the religion of his ancestors, and who holds no such self-
ascription?  
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 We agree that social scientists should avoid reification, not least because there is 
no claim here that the content of Judaism informed theories of nationalism or that there is 
anything inherent in ‘Jewishness’ itself. But care need not block inquiry. On the one hand, 
we are concerned with choices and theorizations, with different roads taken—thereby 
bringing us in line with the demand for biographical specificity. On the other hand, we 
insist that many categories that concern social science are real—actually existing and 
experienced as such. This most certainly can apply to nationalism. But it can also be true 
of Jewish conditions: ascription can make actors deal with Jewish dilemmas even if they 
wished to avoid them, or felt that they had left such circumstances far in their own past. 
Mindful that no one likes to think of themselves as prisoner of their own biography, we 
claim that choices reflected not only responses to nationalism, but also theorizations of 
varied theoretical belongings, normative and descriptive, that followed from real 
integrations and exclusions.  
 
Dilemmas 
 
 The situation facing Jews changed dramatically at the end of the eighteenth 
century. The granting of citizenship rights by the French Revolution allowed Jews the 
possibility of belonging. One should say immediately that there was a sting in the tail from 
the start in the putative opening of nation-states to this historic minority, marked by its 
lack of a territorial base. Clermont-Tonnerre favored the granting of such rights but 
thought fit to add in 1789 that `[W]e must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and 
accord everything to the Jews as individuals…It is repugnant to have…a nation within the 
nation,’ insisting that ‘if they do not want to be citizens, they should say so, and then, we 
should banish them’ (quoted in Hunt 1996: 88). Two years later, and partly in fearful 
response to French emancipation, between 1791 and 1795, the Russian state formalized 
the Pale of Settlement and it territorially confined its Jewish subjects precisely because it 
could not banish them. So emancipation stopped in Eastern Europe in 1878, and for 
Russian Jews it only came with Soviet citizenship. 
 
Still, emancipation was the fundamental tectonic shift that allowed the social 
mobility that led to the massive Jewish contribution to European culture. One consequence 
of this was a deep gratitude for being allowed to enter nation-states and, accordingly, both 
a diminution in attachment to Judaism and the breaking of transnational loyalties. Of 
course, just as the Jews of France became loyal to that country so too Jews elsewhere 
developed patriotic feelings for states that they felt to be their own. Yet Jewish 
confessional fragmentation into national social worlds meant differentiated attachments to 
states—possibilities in some places and panic in others. Ernst Renan’s 1882 ‘What is a 
Nation?’ described possibilities present in France rather than in Cisleithenia. Further, if 
assimilation in post-emancipation France meant that social mobility or ‘entry’ could only 
be achieved by ‘exit’ from the ghetto, by the time emancipation arrived in Germany much 
structural assimilation had already taken place, as had a prior detachment from traditional 
Jewish communities (Birnbaum 1995).  
 
Put differently, how and when nation-states crystallized shaped Jewish positioning 
vis-à-vis emerging nationalisms. The route to nation statehood was slow and organic in 
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France and England because ‘state’ came before ‘nation’ (Mann 1995). In contrast, the 
fact that ‘nation’ came before the ‘nation-state’ in the multiethnic empires placed great 
pressure on Jews. On the one hand, ethnonationalisms ‘from below’ profoundly shaped 
integration’s possibilities and constraints, particularly for rising and socially mobile 
educated Jews; on the other, imperial elites began to feel themselves under threat, and later 
in the period moved to turn empires into nation-states or to homogenize 
administratively—complicating Jews’ already delicate assimilation dilemmas and placing 
them between homogenizing or centralizing empires and the boosted ethnonationalisms 
that imperial nationalizing strategies were creating (Lieven 2000; Miller and Berger 2014). 
 
 This takes us to an important piece of analysis concerning the dilemmas that 
interest us, namely that of the change of tenor in the spirit of nationalism over the 
nineteenth century, from something putatively liberal to something rather different, 
namely anti-Semitic ethnonationalism: 
 
….what [ethnonationalists] hate above all else are just those damned 
cosmopolitans, who lack roots of their own and wish to impose their 
rootlessness on others, and try to make it a universal norm in virtue of 
some grey general humanity. These rootless people are, not 
surprisingly, engaged in activities such as trade or thought, which lead 
them to these bloodless values. But that is not for us, say the romantic 
nationalists: we are rooted to the soil...we feel, we do not 
calculate…and we spurn those who do…(Gellner 1998:19). 
 
This is the classic late nineteenth century cultural blending of the romantic search for 
authenticity with social Darwinism. This insistence on belonging, having roots tying one 
into society placed Jewish minorities in a difficult position, as Gellner noted: 
 
…the minority had no illusion of its own to go back to. It only had the 
recollection of the ghetto, which by definition was not a self-sufficient 
community or culture at all, but an unromantically (commercially) 
specialized sub-community of a wider world within which it was 
pejoratively defined. Although in fact a literary populist nostalgia for 
the shtetl does exist nevertheless, Jewish populist Romanticism is in 
the end a contradiction in terms… 
       So the romantic reaction placed the Jews in a dilemma far sharper 
than the Enlightenment had done. They were largely deprived of the 
illusion of a possible return to the roots, an illusion indulged by their 
gentile neighbours with enthusiasm and conviction. Though shalt not 
covet they neighbour’s Gemeinschaft! But, of course, one does. So 
what’s to be done? The options that were logically open were either to 
infiltrate the Other’s Gemeinschaft, or to create a new one of one’s 
own, whether or not there had been any peasants available for the past 
two millennia, who could define its folk culture (1987: 78).  
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An insistence on the authenticity of roots and theorizations of the assimilationist choice 
are two of the routes that will concern us, especially the moral complexities involved in 
the latter; and we will add a further two. But before turning to them attention must be 
given to two further dimensions of these dilemmas. 
  
 The most immediate involves the consequences of generational choices and 
theorizations made in light of emancipation’s possibilities and constraints. However 
clichéd, ‘fathers’ did hand the ‘sons’ something against which to react—often experienced 
as either too much Judaism or too much assimilationist cosmopolitanism. If the ‘fathers’ 
had made the emotional break with Judaism to raise ‘free cosmopolitans’, the ‘sons’ often 
responded to being raised in ‘nothingness’; while those raised religiously wrestled with 
new cultural sensibilities and choices somewhere between acculturation and assimilation. 
This could characterize something of the German-speaking Jews of Kafka’s Prague, where 
‘blame for the modern dilemma was placed on the liberal values of the fathers’ generation’ 
(Spector 2000: 109; cf. Kadarkay on Lukács 1991). Generational choices became part of 
inherited internal geographies, and they were navigated as such. Differently put, the 
dilemmas of assimilation did not stand still, particularly as the available repertoires of 
belonging and integration multiplied.  
 
 Dilemmas and choices were further structured by geopolitics. After the First World 
War, a rapid succession of geopolitical realties radically changed the character of 
assimilation or integration, and so too the available options, real and theoretical. Late 
nineteenth century dilemmas of belonging were redefined in 1919—the year in which 
pogroms peaked in Europe: the Minority Treaties agreed at Versailles inscribed 
Jewishness ethnolinguistically, moving beyond traditional confessional protections to 
substantively new, culturalist ones (Fink 2006). Jewishness as ethnicity or as nationality 
was rapidly replacing other kinds of attachments, and so too was recognition that it was 
impossible to escape it. Even in the 1920s Soviet Union—arguably one of the unlikeliest 
places for the vigorous pursuit of Jewish autonomy—the reality was that Jewish 
protections would still be relegated to minority rights in someone else’s territorial 
autonomy (Bemporad 2013). The consequences of this reality eventually appeared in a 
world of ferocious nationalist homogenization, indeed one that perfectly exemplified 
Gellner’s ‘one nation, one state’ definition of nationalism. As a consequence, post-
Holocaust thinking closed the long arc of the complex responses to emancipation with a 
return to binaries: some form of assimilation or integration or emigration to one’s ‘own’ 
state—before later attempts to pluralize nation-states.  
 
 While most thinkers of Jewish background had reactions to growing 
ethnonationalisms, theorizations became more urgent and sustained toward the end of the 
period under consideration, not least because the fluidity of multiple and overlapping 
religious, cultural and linguistic identities began to crystallize around rather more fixed 
identifications of ethnicity or nationality. Nevertheless, the political space theorized by 
thinkers shaped by the late nineteenth century—Otto Bauer, Leon Trotsky and Vladimir 
Jabotinsky, György Lukács and Karl Polanyi, Lewis Namier and Hans Kohn—remained 
multiethnic, often aligned with social democratic critiques and attempts to fix and re-
design empires. They sought ways of taming the exclusionary potentials of 
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ethnonationalisms while carving space for an emerging Jewish nationalism. Interwar 
theorizations involving returns to empire were sometimes hopeful nostalgia or futurist 
abstraction. In contrast, later thought was less a product of empire than of 
ethnonationalizing states and traumatizing expulsions. The subsequent generation of 
thinkers born in the first decades of the twentieth century—Karl Popper and Arthur 
Koestler, Berlin and Karl Deutsch, and latterly Gellner and Elie Kedourie—was shaped by 
late-Habsburg liberalism and post-Tsarist socialism. This was the most secular generation: 
liberals and anti-communist intellectuals shattered by the realization that late nineteenth 
century liberalism was less a secure product of social evolution than a benign historical 
oddity (Hacohen 2000, 2012). As a result, these Cold War Atlantic liberals and postwar 
cosmopolitans produced a body of social thought on nationalism defined less by populist 
nostalgia for the shtetl than by nationalist and universalist nostalgias for empires, real or 
invented, warm or abstractly cold, and for social and epistemological worlds free from 
culture’s confinements. 
 
Choices 
 
 In view of how distinctive eras and atmospheres formed the social circumstances 
and conditions against which choices and thought took form, we identify four general 
theoretical frames that resulted, illustrated by exemplars, and note subtle differences 
within them. An initial comment is that there is some sense of historical change, along the 
lines already noted, in the categorization—from the initial emancipation through the 
ending of empires to adapting to life within nation-states. It is important to stress that the 
categories do not so to speak cage individuals. Some thinkers moved very rapidly between 
positions. Disappointment with ‘entry’ could sometimes provoke returns to even more 
particularist forms of loyalty (Birnbaum 1995: 97). Consider too the career of Arthur 
Koestler: from Zionism and socialism to Cold War warrior, with an extraordinary final 
denial that Jews had ever really existed! (Cesarani 1998; Scammell 2010). More common 
and less dramatic was the attempt to occupy two positions at the same time, sometimes 
creating confusion within the social theories that resulted. But it is equally important to 
distinguish responses to nationalism that did not necessarily result in theoretical 
engagement from those that occasioned greater or more sustained reflection on the 
character of nations and nationalism. We move carefully between both in the exemplars 
below. 
 
Assimilation and erasure 
 
One response to ethnonationalism’s dilemmas was assimilation, a term we use here 
broadly and non-categorically to stretch the spectrum of differentiated attachments from 
various forms of acculturation to integration to ethnic ‘disappearance’.  Indeed the 
spectrum of qualities that defined a ‘assimilated Jew’ became more varied and subtle, 
almost elastic in character, with important implications about choices and theorizations. 
Sociological constraints mattered as much as intellectual commitment: ‘assimilated’ could 
mean virtually any degree of cultural distance from the experience of the shtetl Jew, 
destabilizing even the most ‘assimilated’. As Stanislawski wrote of the Russian writer and 
Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky:  
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….culturally Russified, not totally unaware of his Jewish origin but 
largely oblivious to and uninterested in its meaning and import. To call 
this stance that of an ‘assimilated’ or ‘acculturated’ Jew is to vastly 
understate and underrate the psychological, ideological, and social 
complexity of political and cultural identity for [Russia’s] 
cosmopolitan Jews of the fin de siècle. (2001: 131-32). 
 
Unlike the more constraining social ascriptions experienced in shetl communities, many 
assimilated Jews like Jabotinsky were raised ‘with the knowledge that we were Jewish but 
didn’t have to be’ (quote in Halkin 2014: 16). This wrestling with the assimilationist 
choice inspired in Jabotinsky the most essentialist theorization of nationalism: how, he 
reasoned, could a ‘pure blooded’ Jew assimilate and not erase his own subjectivity 
(Mogilner 2013: 7-8)? Put differently, the assimilationist position (whether premised on 
acculturation, assimilation or erasure) theoretically implies social constructivism, that is, 
the possibility of choice and of multiple attachments when faced with the challenges of 
allegiance. Its power as a theoretical frame is that it recognizes the basic social fact of 
existing forms of assimilation and integration. This position stands in stark contrast with 
that of ‘authenticity’ and ‘essentialism’, discussed below. 
 
The various attachments implied in the assimilationist choice could of course be 
principled based on genuine admiration for what was believed to be a high culture. But 
was instrumentally motivated assimilation merely opportunism, to be distrusted because it 
lacked conviction? Could invisible roots be uncovered for those who had converted? 
These challenges could involve attempts at total erasure, with the internal Jewish charge of 
self-hatred often aimed less at those seeking exit from Jewishness than at those seeking to 
erase it. In these decades socialist internationalism could imply this kind of self-erasure. 
But even as denial, ‘exit’ could be accepted as normalized partly because of its ubiquity, 
partly because of an almost silent recognition of its historic necessity depending on time 
and place, and partly because it still accorded a certain negative recognition. But more 
could be involved. Malachi Hacohen’s earliest treatment of Popper noted not just anti-
Zionism but touches of anti-Semitism in a riveting critique that stressed the loneliness that 
came from dreaming of the open society, and failing to appreciate the home that Zionism 
offered (Hacohen 1996).  
 
Still the most ubiquitous response to these pressures was patriotism, seen in high 
rates of volunteering in war (Aberbach 2013). When asked by the city of Paris in 1916 as 
to policy towards incoming Russian Jews, and animated by a cultural confidence from 
within an assimilated experience, Durkheim argued that Russian Jews’ voluntary 
conscription (and war death) rates demonstrated exceptional patriotism since they 
understood very well how much they owed France (Elkarati 1990). Echoing Clermont-
Tonnerre, Durkheim thought Jewish distinctiveness would disappear given political 
inclusion and an absence of anti-Semitism. His remarkable defence of the Ostjuden 
brought veiled accusations of his being ‘d’une lignée étrangère’, however, thereby 
poignantly exposing integration’s fragility, not least since Durkheim had just lost his own 
son in the defense of France. If this is one piece of evidence of the extent to which the 
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determination to enter could go, it is equally important to note another—and one which 
points immediately to the ability to hold seemingly different positions, including 
assimilation, at the same time. ‘Jewish patriotism was compatible with Zionism—indeed 
many of its leaders gave patriotism as a reason for their Zionism’ (Aberbach 2013: xxxiii). 
 
If assimilation into a national state like France, Germany or England was easily 
imaginable, matters were more complex in the multinational empires. Gellner’s (1998) 
brilliant account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy makes this very clear. The early philosophy 
was formal and abstract, the world to which it belonged wholly lacking in ethnicity. What 
this means in practical terms can be seen in Popper’s account of an open society—one of 
pure cosmopolitanism, opposed to all nationalism, including that of Zionism, always 
insisting on the need to assimilate (Hacohen 1996). Gellner’s celebrated charge against 
Wittgenstein was of course that he moved from one unworldly position to another, its 
absolute opposite. His later philosophy did not seek to assimilate to the most obvious real 
alternative, that of high German culture, but instead to immersion in peasant 
communities—or, more particularly, going off to teach in a village school, armed with a 
philosophy that insisted that truth varies by locality. This is an extreme form of populism, 
and one that certainly ended badly in practical terms for Wittgenstein himself.  
 
Therefore one way the complexities of the assimilationist position can be 
recognized is simple. To gain entry to a society requires two background conditions, 
release by the group to which one belongs and acceptance by the group one wishes to join. 
Berlin captured the difficulties that could result for Jews when seeking entry in two 
famous essays, `Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx and the Search for Identity’ and `Jewish 
Slavery and Emancipation’. In the first he noted that an outsider seeking entry gains such 
expertise on local rules as thereby to make him an object of suspicion. `The search for 
security seems to those who are secure a symptom of abnormality, and often irritates 
them’ (Berlin 1979: 256). The second essay continued the line of argument by considering 
Jews as hunchbacks—at times denying they had a hump, on other occasions celebrating it, 
with a further contortion in seeking to hide it altogether (Berlin 2000). Gellner made 
similar points in his private notes: `We mid European Jews—exactly like man according 
to existentialism—choosing attributes, being given none. Human situation, only somewhat 
more so. Unfortunately, it is of the essence of those attributes that they are not chosen but 
given. If chosen, are somehow false. Not surprisingly, a mainly descent-based society 
values givenness of attributes more than endeavour, contrary to Kant’ (quoted in Hall 
2010: 87-8). Both thinkers accepted that these existential pressures could lead to self-
hatred, to accepting the standards of others as part of a visceral desire to escape one’s past, 
whether real or ascribed. A minimal claim can be that of disloyalty to one’s cultural 
heritage, abandoning much of great value (Birnbaum 2008). But the charge can carry 
much more weight: it can be seen as the Jewish community condemning its own, making 
it hard for an individual to leave.  
 
Choices and reactions--and the theoretical positions that could result--changed once 
an ethnic Jewishness and ‘normalized’ nationhood became viable attachments. These 
could imply a lack of loyalty because they challenged the social gains of generations of 
assimilationists. For one thing, the rise of organicist nationalisms combined with the 
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Western migration of the Ostjuden imposed on the assimilated Jews of Germany, Austria, 
France and Hungary a redefinition ‘from within’, challenging the hard-won assimilation of 
many who felt that they had left behind their Jewish backgrounds. For another, thinkers of 
Ostjuden background such as Bauer, Trotsky, or Namier could be particularly vulnerable 
to a very real—if often only silently acknowledged—sense of perceived inferiority in 
relation to co-ethnics in Vienna or Berlin or Prague, and this was reflected in their 
understandings of nationalism, to which we now turn. 
 
Wider Worlds, Real and Imaginary 
 
 Europe’s political space at the turn of the nineteenth century was filled not just by 
national states slowly morphing into nation-states, but also by the great land empires of the 
Hapsburgs and Romanovs. Thinkers with Jewish backgrounds increasingly felt themselves 
attracted to such entities.  
 
An old and rigid dynasty, long linked with hierarchy, authoritarianism, and 
obscurantist dogmatism did not exactly look like promising material for 
being the symbol of this new Open Society. But, comic though it might be, 
the logic of the situation made it so (Gellner 1998: 33).  
 
The rise of ethnonationalism suggested that Jews were somehow defective in lacking 
roots. Anxieties with emerging unities were real. So a deep distrust of nationalism gave 
rise to imperial ideals that allowed for pluralism, that is for world where one could be both 
a full citizen and yet remain as Jewish as one wished. Five favorable views of a wider 
world resulted, each briefly considered in turn.  
 
The first such general view is captured by considering those nationalists and 
accommodationists that sought Jewish autonomy within composite political frameworks. 
A very early such approach can be seen in Denmark. Meyer Goldschmidt took an active 
role in Danish politics at the time of the struggle between the National Liberals of 
Copenhagen and the German-speaking population of Holstein and of part of Schleswig 
(Jensen and Hall 2014). A dislike of the ethnonationalism of the National Liberals led 
Goldschmidt to create a federal plan designed to hold together the composite polity. This 
failed, perhaps indeed never had much chance. Nikolai Grundtvig, the Moses of modern 
Denmark, decisively rejected it, noting further that a Jew had no business interfering in 
Danish affairs. A slightly different approach was that of Joseph Samuel Bloch in Hapsburg 
Vienna (Reifowitz 2003; Rozenblit 2001). A defender of Jewish rights, Bloch challenged 
the integrationist assimilationism of the post-emancipation Jewish liberal middle classes. 
As a Hapsburg dynastic patriot, he opposed a Jewish separate political nation but asserted 
the possibility of Stamm Jewishness within a federal, decentralized Cisleithenia. He 
imagined the creation of a civic Austrian-ness that could retrieve Jewishness from its 
emancipationist relegation to confessional status and enable Jews to exist as an ethnicity 
within wider political frames. In the Tsarist Empire, Yiddishists’ attempts to gain official 
‘national’ recognition represented a similar version of this kind of national 
accommodationism (Karlip 2014). Secular diasporic Jewish nationalism moved from its 
earlier liberal mooring toward more organicist, integral and even illiberal versions. Living 
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among small stateless nations of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, Yiddishism 
embodied a populist version of Jewish cultural nationalism. This secular autonomism 
failed, though Bundist and Yiddishist ‘Jewish Jews’, tasked by the ‘non-Jewish Jews’ of 
the Bolshevik elite with designing early Soviet Jewish policies, later resurrected a version 
of it in the 1920s Soviet Union. 
 
A second and slightly different attempt to deal with multiethnicity was proposed 
by Austrian socialists keen to reform the late Hapsburg Empire. Otto Bauer and Karl 
Renner thought large economic blocs represented the wave of the future. This led them to 
theorize the possibility of multinational states in which politics would be de-ethnicized 
and national consciousness could be detached from territory. In contrast to the forms of 
cultural autonomy discussed above, Renner and Bauer’s model was based on the 
‘personality principle’, which held that autonomous communities could be organized as 
individualized autonomies, something contrasted with the ‘territorial principle’ 
characteristic of the modern nation-state (Nimni 2005). Prescriptively, therefore, large 
socialist states did not need to be homogeneous. Bauer and Renner defined the nation 
culturally, as a matter of choice, but ultimately diverged on Austria-Hungary: Renner 
remained in favor of the empire’s survival, whilst Bauer called for its dissolution. Bauer 
was ambivalent about his Ostjuden background and insecure about his own newly 
Germanized identity, resulting in an ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent rejection of an 
articulated sense of nationhood for Jews; Renner’s Christian background carried no such 
identity dilemmas, and he could feel secure in his German-ness in a way that few 
assimilated Jews could (Reifowitz 2009). Both contended that nationality was a matter of 
choice, but if Bauer’s theorization ‘became somewhat muddled when he discussed Jews’, 
then Renner’s was more consistent in viewing Jewish assimilation less problematically 
(Reifowitz 2009: 1-2).  
   
A third position was that of Left-wing empire savers: the early Bolsheviks and, 
from a different set of conditions, Lukács. Slightly different from the Austro-Marxists, 
their theorizations and prescriptions involved a more thoroughgoing reshaping of the 
social conditions held to have given rise to nationalism. Given the constraining social and 
political conditions of Tsarist Jewry, the largely assimilated Jewish Bolshevik elite sought 
to radically redefine them: saving the empire was less a way of submerging nationalism 
and its attachments, than of relativizing it in a reconstructed universalist space (Riga 2012: 
chapter three). In theory, nationalist particularism would melt away as socialism advanced, 
though in the interim culture’s contents could be held in universalism’s socialist 
containers, that is, socialist in content but national in form (Lenin 1913). Marxist theory 
aside, however, the Bolsheviks had diagnosed nationalism as a product of political and 
cultural grievance—hence their generous nationality policies of the 1920s. But their own 
fragile assimilationism had created an intellectual blind spot, namely the failure to 
recognize the anti-Semitism within the very ethnicities into which they themselves were 
entering. In the end, socialist nation building resulted in disaster for Jews because in 
practice it meant only cultural autonomy in someone else’s territorial autonomy, and an 
eventual re-ethnicization of Jewishness (Bemporad 2013). Despite the theoretical rejection 
of Austro-Hungary and Tsarism, not least for their obscurantism and authoritarianism, 
there is nevertheless a good deal of difference between the Bolsheviks and Lukács. If 
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Bolshevik theorizations are best understood in structural terms, the Hungarian was part of 
the late nineteenth century world, of Jewish rootlessness in the face of Nietzschean 
demands for authenticity, for the creation of a meaningful soul. Kadarkay’s brilliant 
biography described the links with Martin Buber, and with Georg Simmel and Max Weber 
(Kadarkay 1991). What is most striking is Lukács’s fascination with Dostoyevsky and 
Kierkegaard in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. The desire to escape 
‘disenchantment’, to be part of a heroic community, propelled Lukács to communism. 
Aesthetics led to political commitment (cf. Bell 1980: chapter 17).  
 
A fourth position within these wider worlds was that of cosmopolitan dreams of 
empire. Perhaps the greatest theorist of this world was, as noted, Popper: his 
cosmopolitanism was so to speak total, privileging reason above all else. This makes him 
somewhat different from Elie Kedourie, his colleague at the London School of Economics 
for many years. Both felt that nationalism was the evil creation of a particular set of 
German intellectuals, and both had considerable nostalgia for the empires from which they 
came. But Popper’s philosophy was positive, seeking to re-create a cosmopolitan world in 
a different guise. Kedourie stands poles apart from this position. The influence of Michael 
Oakeshott can be detected in his insistence that we should submerge ourselves in a 
tradition of political wisdom, repudiating abstract reason at all costs (O’Leary 2002).  
 
The fifth and final position sought to create new kinds of world order so as to 
defang nationalism. Budapest produced not just Lukács but also Karl Polanyi whose sense 
of the ‘need’ for belonging was reinforced by the fact that his Russian mother had populist 
sympathies. His wonderful Great Transformation (2002) can be read in this light. 
Capitalism constantly causes disruptive change, as Schumpeter had also emphasized, 
though in a more positive vein when speaking of `creative destruction’. This was 
potentially dangerous: societies understandably might seek to protect themselves from the 
market. Polanyi’s interpretation of the twentieth century is that precisely this occurred, 
with protection being provided by the Nazis for Germans traumatized by war, inflation 
and the Great Depression. In his late years Polanyi moved towards positive prescriptions, 
urging the creation ‘tamed empires’ able to interact peacefully—together with hopes that 
small nations, the unhistoric nations, would slowly disappear (Dale forthcoming). The 
same intellectual drive can be seen in a subtly different form in the work of Karl Deutsch, 
a Germanized Czech of Jewish background. Reference here is not to his Nationalism and 
Social Communication (1953), an important book to which Gellner’s work, as we shall 
see, is rather indebted. What matters in this context is the co-authored volume he 
organized dealing with what he termed security communities (Deutsch et al 1957). 
Although these came in slightly different forms, the basic idea is clear: a shared system of 
values would allow for high levels of co-operation between a set of states—the recreation 
of Austro-Hungary in a section of the world polity.  
 
Liberalism and the Nation-State 
 
 The creation of new nation-states in Europe as the result of imperial collapse 
combined with the horrors of ethnic cleansing, population transfers and the Holocaust 
place at the center of attention the simplest of questions: how can the nation-state be made 
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safe from the horrors of nationalism. The positions examined here respond to the brutal 
implications of Gellner’s celebrated definition of nationalism in which each nation has its 
own state, and each state its own nation. Might there be ways of imagining a loosening 
this tight, homogenizing formula so as to make life bearable for those with Jewish 
backgrounds and others similarly excluded?  
 
The career of Hans Kohn is of especial interest (Gordon 2010). A Jewish 
background in Prague made Jewish concerns immediately central in the years before 1914 
because a move towards the German community was more completely blocked than was 
in the case for Lukács in Budapest due to the rise of German ethnonationalism in 
Bohemia. Kohn’s early membership in Bar Kochba stressed the need for spiritual renewal, 
considering Jews at that time in the most essentialist way imaginable. The experience of 
war and of the collapse of the empire led to political commitments replacing cultural 
longings, allowing him to leave behind his early esssentialism. Kohn’s greatest hope was 
for the survival of multinational states. Hence the creation of new nation-states led him to 
move to Palestine, to participate in the Zionist adventure. But by 1934 he had become 
deeply disillusioned. Zionism had held the ideological promise in his eyes of inclusion, the 
possibility of a bi-national state. As it became ever clear that a Jewish state would seek to 
be as homogeneous as new nation-states of Central Europe, he left for the United States. 
The rest of his career was devoted to the most famous distinction in the theory of 
nationalism, namely that between civic and ethnic nationalism. This stark opposition 
represents a Cold War warrior’s commitment to liberal values, and the hope that these 
would be shared by new nations, combined with the fear that some political cultures would 
always think with their blood, and so were effectively irredeemable. 
 
 A rather different version of liberal nationalism came from Isaiah Berlin, as can be 
seen in his response to an interview in which Arthur Koestler claimed that the foundation 
of Israel meant that Jews should either go to Israel or totally assimilate in the countries in 
which they lived. Berlin was well aware of Jewish conditions, not least as he admired 
Lewis Namier, to whom we turn in a moment, and he certainly felt that the foundation of 
Israel made a huge difference to Jewish self-perception. But he wished to remain in the 
diaspora, and so argued for integration rather than assimilation—that is, for difference, the 
right to one’s religion or ethnicity, the insistence on the right to hold multiple identities. 
This liberal nationalism was famously justified by Berlin by reference to Herder 
(Birnbaum 2008: chapter six; Hacohen 2012). Though there is much to admire here, his 
viewpoint has been subject to serious criticism. Malachi Hacohen’s most recent work on 
Popper represents something of a change of heart on his part, stressing as it does elements 
of great moral merit. 
 
In acculturation, Popper saw an opportunity, not a threat. The encounter with 
the Other, with the foreign and the new, with the different and unexpected, 
was often uncomfortable, but it was exciting, an opportunity to learn and 
expand—to change. Like scholarly criticism, it was the sine qua non for 
progress. At the height of Thomas Kuhn’s popularity, when his 
incommensurable scientific paradigms—worldviews which made arbitrating 
evidence impossible because they spoke different languages—were used to 
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explain difficulties in cultural exchange, Popper insisted that paradigms were 
myths: Communication across cultures was always possible, although not 
easy. He preferred empires to nation states because they encouraged cross-
cultural interaction, the litmus test of the Open Society. The cosmopolitan 
commonwealth opened up closed communities and loosened ethnocultural 
identities. To Berlin’s Herderian mosaic of closed ethnic cultures, Popper 
counter-posed a dynamic Open Society, a liberal cosmopolitan alternative 
(Hacohen 2012: xx). 
 
The charge against Berlin is then that of essentialism. Further, Popper’s view is 
sociologically realistic given that so many Jews had made their contribution by 
assimilating to larger worlds. 
 
 Ernest Gellner’s position was subtler. He differed from Popper personally and 
intellectually: a childhood in Prague had led him to like nationalism whose appearance wh 
saw as a structural necessity rather that a reversion to the womb. But he agreed with and 
added to the charge of essentialism. Berlin’s value pluralism was held to be incoherent: it 
was relativism, and relativism was in the end the last refuge of a scoundrel. Crucially, how 
can you insist on pluralism whilst wanting nation states, including Israel, to have distinct 
identities of their own? Gellner felt that Berlin had accepted far too much of the local 
culture in order to ‘get in’, becoming, to use his vicious expression, `a Court Jew’. The 
charge, in other words, is of a sort of British populism held to be entirely reprehensible 
since Berlin, thanks to his own experience, ought to have known better. The customs of 
the country, a purported national style of pluralism and tolerance, provided no firm base 
for real philosophy. Critical monism was necessary (Gellner 1974). 
 
 Nonetheless, Gellner worried greatly about the dangers of nationalism within 
nation-states. He had rejected Popper’s argument against the naturalistic fallacy, insisting 
that one could and should ‘jump on the historical bandwagon’, that is, read off one’s 
morals from the historical process, at least in one careful and particular way (Gellner 
1964). Industrial society was held to be transforming the world, making decent behavior 
possible where it had been scarcely imaginable in agrarian conditions of scarcity. This 
view most certainly affected his view of the condition of Jews in the advanced world—so 
much so that he irritated Anthony Smith in a lecture by suggesting that the worst was over, 
with growth papering over all cracks. The difference with Berlin really revolves around 
the fact that Gellner truly had no deep sense of belonging, to any culture, though felt 
sufficiently close to Czech culture to have some sense of the nature of belonging. If 
growth could contain nationalism, so to could `ironic cultural nationalism’--a sense of 
belonging lightly held (Gellner 1974). But in last years of his life he was absolutely 
haunted by the horrors of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and fearful that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union might yet create chaos similar to that following the world wars. So his late 
thought entertained new prescriptive thoughts. The discovery of Malinowski’s politics was 
correspondingly of great importance for him. Here is what Gellner hoped for: 
 
  The League commissioner, perhaps a minor Habsburg archduke, would work 
discreetly from some functional but unostentatious secretariat located in a 
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new edifice if some anonymous London suburb—say Neasden. An architect 
in the Bauhaus tradition would be commissioned to design it. All ritual and 
symbolic activities, on the other hand, would continue to be based in 
Buckingham Palace. Thus the English would be emotionally spared any 
visible, let alone conspicuous, externalization of expression of their 
diminished sovereignty (1998: 78). 
 
History had shown, he added, that Franz Joseph was better than Joseph. Further, the 
‘universal protection of cultural autonomy, combined with political restraint imposed by a 
benevolent center, must clearly appeal to an age like ours which suffers from the opposite 
condition—political independence combined with dreary cultural standardization’ (1998: 
79). Here we have a measure of nostalgia for Austro-Hungary. But are not Malinowski’s 
prescriptions in the end close to Berlin’s preferences, despite his scorn for his Oxford 
contemporary?  
 
There is a further similarity between Berlin and Gellner. It is of course the case 
that a main part of Gellner’s own view of nationalism is functionalist nonsense. But it is 
childishly jejune to say that this is all that there is in his theory of nationalism (Meadwell 
2012). Two elements stand out, both of which involve human agency. The first view 
establishes agency by noting that political elites sought to homogenize a society so as to 
increase their own power. Here is Gellner describing the origins of ethnonationalism in 
Austro-Hungary:  
 
 It had all begun with the Empire trying to increase its own efficiency and 
effectiveness by centralizing and streamlining its bureaucracy. At first this 
provoked a hostile reaction from the old, initially quite non-ethnic 
regionalisms, from the local institutions and the nobility that manned them. 
But it also helped engender the new, non-regional, but ethnic nationalism: by 
making bureaucracy more important and pervasive, it underscored the 
importance of culture and language. Full effective citizenship now belonged 
to those who could deal with the bureaucracy in an idiom it respected, and 
who were masters of that idiom (1998: 31). 
 
At various points Gellner went on to speak of the ‘humiliation’ felt by those who were 
turned into second class citizens by the actions of the state. Interestingly there is some 
similarity with Berlin’s occasional attempts to explain nationalism as a force driven by 
reaction to alien rule (Berlin 1972). The moral that one can draw from this is that 
multinational states might hold together if liberal accommodations of various sorts were to 
be made. But it should be emphasized that Gellner did not accept this, and his late 
prescriptive views are very different in character. The second strand is fundamentally that 
of Deutsch’s Nationalism and Social Communication, which Gellner dismissed too easily 
through a clever sleight of hand (Gellner 1983: 126-7). The entry of an ethnic majority 
into cities as the result of industrialization is potential social dynamite. A formerly 
dominant minority can resist; equally a newly educated majority—at least, its leaders—
can establish quotas against that minority thereby causing it to turn to violence, as so 
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clearly happened in Sri Lanka (Lange 2012: cf. Gellner 1998: 23). There is a good deal of 
sense to this position.  
 
Authenticity and Essentialism 
 
The essentialist position has been noted in connection with Berlin and Kohn, but it 
is worth exploring further because it reflected differently animated theorizations of 
authenticity, something perhaps best seen through those who theorized Zionism as a form 
of nationalism. Viewed through the lens of Jewish conditions, an insistence on return to 
essentialized roots stood in opposition to the kinds of constructivist theorizations of 
assimilation described above. Jabotinsky, for instance, maintained that tribal essentialism 
was the only true response to the ‘tragic illusiveness of the assimilationist choice’ 
(Mogilner 2013: 37). One consequence of this essentialist theorization was that its identity 
implications could make assimilated Jews uncomfortable. But another was that it allowed 
release from difficult dilemmas because it removed the instrumentalism or opportunism 
implied in the assimilationist choice. The essentialist position required, in other words, not 
Popper’s total assimilation, or the Wittgensteinian erasure of Jewishness into someone 
else’s essentialism, but rather a complete submersion into one’s ‘own’.  
 
And yet inconsistencies could be apparent. Kohn’s early cultural Zionist 
essentialism in Bar Kochba, Jabotinsky’s later essentialism in a revisionist Zionism, and 
Namier’s anti-Polish Zionism paradoxically had no theoretical space for their own actually 
existing assimilation. Their theoretical espousal of authenticity was itself a product of the 
mixing of assimilation. Of course Zionism was not incompatible with forms of 
assimilation, Namier’s simultaneous Zionist and British loyalties show (cf. Aberbach 
2013). But it also emerged entwined with other late nineteenth century European 
nationalisms, not only in response to anti-Semitism, but also to disillusionment with the 
Haskalah, to the difficult lives of the Ostjuden, to the ethnicization of Jewishness, and to 
the intellectual contents of the fin-de-siècle, including organicism, secularism and spiritual 
renewal (Hroch 2007; Stanislawski 2001). Unlike those for whom wider worlds were 
appealing, here a shared aversion to empire—in all its forms—was evident. Jabotinsky and 
Kohn’s pre-Holocaust, pre-state Zionism envisioned binational arrangements in a Jewish 
and Arab Palestine, but these were nevertheless based on (two) essentialized cultures. 
Kohn’s early cultural and spiritual Zionism was rooted in the anti-assimilationist, anti-
imperialism of a Hapsburg Prague generation (Gordon 2010: 277); Namier’s consistent 
anti-Polishness paralleled his anti-Habsburg stance (Colley 1989); and Jabotinsky rejected 
composite political frames precisely because they led to assimilation and cultural mixing 
(Mogilner 2013).  
 
Theorizing origins and authenticity, in other words, could also be responses to 
experienced assimilation. This was the case for Namier: born in Catholic Eastern Galicia 
to highly Polonized parents—so Polonized indeed that he did not learn of his Jewishness 
until he was ten—he became a committed Zionist from his twenties. He rejected the 
radical assimilation of his upbringing only to later convert to Anglicanism to marry. In a 
life that was ‘marginal and deeply ambiguous’, Namier’s search of an identity that would 
‘hold and endure’ caused him to suffer both real and imagined academic anti-Semitism in 
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Britain, a country he loved (Colley 1989: 7). He was a harsh critic of Poland’s minority 
policies while working for the Foreign Office as Whitehall’s Central European specialist 
at Versailles, an experience that found its way into his understanding of nationalism. 
Namier (1958) distinguished between ‘territorial nationalities’, which should be supported 
because they are conservative products of long historical developments, and ‘linguistic 
nationalities’, which should be opposed because they are destructive and unstable in 
seeking political states coextensive with linguistic nationality. So 1848 had unleashed an 
‘era of linguistic nationalisms’ across Central Europe, challenging those liberties 
established by existing territorial nations. Namier (1958: 31-38, 53) explicitly adopted 
Kohn’s distinction between western and eastern nationalisms, with essentialism assigned 
to those that came last. He approvingly cited Mill’s idea that the boundaries of government 
are best if they coincide in the main with those of nationalities: freedom is best protected 
in self-contained homogenous communities of territorial nationalities. But German 
nationalism had an awkward and reviled place in his theorizing, being of the ‘Eastern’ 
ethnic variety. His view of Jewishness was similarly essentialized, though for different 
reasons: Jews were held together by an ‘undefinable bond’ so the answer was either 
‘national reintegration in Palestine’ or ‘deliberate dissolution’ (Namier 1947: 145-148). 
 
Jabotinsky went further: all patriotic integration was inherently untenable. The 
most important Zionist of Russia’s aesthetic ‘silver age’, Jabotinsky epitomized the 
essentialist response to Jewish conditions in the most crystallized way. Like Trotsky, he 
was a product of the unique cultural pluralism of Odessa, perhaps the only city in the 
Empire where Jewishness had real possibilities for self-definition. But he argued that 
nationalism was a natural and positive form of social organization, not a social 
construction: nations were the biological essence of human collectives whose specificity 
and purity had to be preserved (Mogilner 2013; Halkin 2014: 77-78). Though his path 
from assimilated cosmopolitanism to essentialist nationalist is contested, Jabotinsky’s 
latter nationalism may have been a modernist reconfiguration of Jewishness in the 
humanist and cultural aesthetic of the European fin de siècle with his earlier 
cosmopolitanism perhaps more ‘Jewish’ than the label ‘assimilated’ might connote 
(Stanislawski 2001; Halkin 2014). What mattered most was Jabotinsky’s engagement with 
Odessa’s imperial Russian cosmopolitanism, with Russia’s distinctive fin de siècle 
(Mogilner 2013). Distant from the experiences of the shetl, and armed with Russian 
culture as a universal medium of modernity, Jabotinsky was less concerned with the 
material lives of shetl Jews than with the survival of modern urban Jews in imperial cities 
tempted to leave the isolation of closed communities. Jabotinsky therefore imagined a 
postimperial cosmopolitan world not free of cultural tribes, but constituted by them, by 
‘blood-land’ communities and ‘island utopias’. Indeed he rejected Russian-Jewish 
Yiddishist and Socialist autonomists and their Habsburg models on the grounds that 
cultural autonomy was the false choice of cultural hybridity. The future belonged to the 
homogenous nation-state (Mogilner 2013: 14-16).  
 
Jabotinsky’s most important novel, The Five, distills the disintegration of modern 
empires through the last decades of an Odessa comprised only of minorities. Assimilatory 
Russification had ‘got even with us’, he wrote: ‘gradual, unwilling, dismal…but inevitable 
and irrevocable, with conversions, mixed marriages, and the complete annihilation of the 
 16 
race’; its futility lay in the final recognition that ‘old prejudices’ are always nevertheless 
‘fragments of ancient truths’ (Jabotinsky 2005: 1, 170-171, 194). The five ‘deaths’ 
embody the consequences the assimilationist choice, which is ultimately the spiritual and 
social destruction of authenticity (Mogilner (2013: 37-44). One such death was the suicide 
of a ‘victim of assimilation’, turned away from essentialist roots. But there are also 
metaphorical deaths: futile attempts to compensate for the emptiness inside with fin de 
siècle contents like conversion and revolutionary communism. To embrace the ‘pure-
blooded’ reproduction of community was to make the most radical anti-assimilationist 
choice. Integral nationalism’s exclusivity of origins offered Russia’s Jews both a 
‘dignified perception of self’ and a response to the meaninglessness and loss of 
subjectivity involved in assimilation. Himself a metaphorical embodiment of the loss of 
empire to a new world of nation-states, Jabotinsky experienced this ‘self-reductionism’, a 
sacrifice of his own cultural hybridity at the altar of nationalism (Mogilner 2013: 44). 
These were the costs and gains of authenticity over assimilation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Reflection on the contextual origins of these thinkers’ paradigms allows us to see 
why there may be disproportion in Jewish thinkers’ contributions to theorizations of 
nationalism. Of course others faced similar dilemmas: Irish theorists and colonial subjects 
also experienced the marginalities and exclusions of empire; in the Ottoman case it was 
indeed outsiders—expelled from the Balkans—who thought most about nationalism. We 
suggest that the responses and theorizations of these excluded individuals might more 
clearly be seen in relation to those of Jewish social thinkers, just as we might better 
understand what the latter’s cultural positioning made visible, and what it obscured.  
 
The consequences of emancipation entangled with moves to indirect rule and the 
end of empires differentially affected Jewish intellectuals, occasioning particular identity 
dilemmas and ambiguities. The traumas involved in the deprivations of ‘home’, painful 
expulsions from states they had called their own, and forced retreats from the fruits of 
generations of hard-fought political entry were massive. This hints at a final suggestive 
image: the complete loss of empire—for those who could not manage at all—led to 
suicide, prefigured in the Jewish doctor in Roth’s The Radetzsky March, and acted out by 
Stefan Zweig (Prochnik 2014: Zweig 1943). The melancholic nostalgia characteristic of 
Zweig’s fin-de-siècle generation—the last to be ‘free of all confinements’ in ‘the last 
century of assured values’—was deeply affected by the brutality of imperial 
disintegrations. The mood and its theorizations changed for the interwar generation. 
Captured by Améry (1980) as ‘mimic German’, deepest identities suddenly seemed 
‘invalid’ on the realization that perhaps they had never been this one or that one. Gellner’s 
austere theorization grasped something of the consequences of this with typical crispness: 
‘[a] man without a nation defies the recognized categories and provokes revulsion’ 
(Gellner 1983: 6).  
 
These visceral experiences led to powerful theories of nationalism that--once 
detached from their original instantiations—created much of the grammar of nationalist 
studies. What might we say, therefore, about the ‘accuracy’ of their theories of 
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nationalism, and of their relationship to the conditions that produced them? A set of 
negative points forces itself upon us immediately. Neither assimilation nor 
linguistic/cultural autonomy worked in the world of emergent nation states. Empire saving 
visions, whether of the early Bloch or Bauer or the later Bolshevik experiment all came to 
nothing. Further once Jewishness had lost the historic confessional mooring that had 
enabled a certain kind of integration, assimilation dilemmas shifted because Jews had 
become an ethnic nation like others, though crucially one without territory. Of course, 
there was then little space for nations within nations. So dreams of wider non-ethnically 
homogeneous worlds, liberal or socialist, mostly fared badly. The visions of Popper and 
Kedourie amounted to little: they were too abstract for real human beings and 
descriptively either nostalgic or a rationalist misreading of how past empires actually 
worked. Kohn’s final ethnic-civic distinction offered no more guidance largely because 
many civic nation-states have ethnic cores, something his own Zionism recognized 
experientially if not intellectually. Finally, essentialism precludes real understanding of the 
very pervasive social and historical fact of assimilation, weakening it as an accurate theory 
of nationalism. 
 
 Curiously, Berlin and Gellner do push the agenda of nationalism studies forward. Of 
course, they reveal each other’s weaknesses—the toughness of Gellner’s definition 
challenged by Berlin’s concern with integration, the philosophical weakness of the 
historian ideas of ideas challenged by the philosophe. But both suggest, though neither 
fully theorizes, the possibility that liberal arrangements may allow for several nations to 
live under a shared political roof. The diminution of levels of geopolitical conflict gives 
one hope that stable geopolitical conditions may allow states to be less unitary and 
homogeneous. But liberal design is never easy. The Moravian Compromise of 1905 is 
often cited as showing that Cisleithenia was moving in that direction, but that view has 
been very effectively challenged (Kelly 2003). A huge agenda accordingly remains in 
front of us—that of turning hopes into realities.
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